Mere Withdrawal of Promise to Marry Not Suicide Abetment: Kerala High Court – News18

Last Updated:October 30, 2024, 18:25 IST

The HC observed that “a word uttered in a fit of anger without intending the consequences to follow can’t be called instigation”

The Kerala High Court has held that “mere withdrawal of a promise to marry without anything more would not amount to abetment of suicide” within the meaning of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court delivered the verdict while allowing the discharge application filed by the accused, finding that the evidence did not substantiate the offence of abetment to suicide against him.

A single-judge bench comprising Justice CS Sudha was hearing a case concerning the alleged abetment of suicide following the breakdown of a relationship. The case was filed by the sister of the deceased woman Anju, who committed suicide after her relationship with the accused/ petitioner, Biju Kumar, reportedly deteriorated after he received a government job and allegedly demanded a dowry of 101 sovereigns of gold from the deceased woman’s family. Unable to meet the demand, Anju’s family faced increased tension with Kumar, who reportedly began distancing himself from Anju. When Biju’s marriage was arranged with another woman, Anju became distressed and later took her own life on October 3, 2013. Following her death, the deceased’s family accused Biju of abetment, contending that his actions led her to commit suicide.

An initial report was filed under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for unnatural death. However, the investigation later implicated Kumar under Section 306 IPC, alleging abetment of suicide based on Anju’s diary entries that expressed feelings of betrayal, anger, and heartbreak due to Kumar’s actions.

The court, analysing the definition of “abetment” under Section 107 IPC, noted that for an action to constitute abetment, there must be clear instigation or intentional assistance that compels the victim to take their own life. The court observed that “a word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation”.

The court referenced the Supreme court’s ruling in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2009), which held: “Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the precedents make it clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence.”

Also relying on the Supreme Court’s verdict in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001), which established that the accused’s actions must have created such circumstances that the victim saw no alternative but to end their life, the High Court found no active or deliberate instigation, urging, or facilitation by the accused that would push the deceased woman to suicide.

The court also examined diary entries penned by the deceased, expressing her frustration, heartbreak, and dismay over the accused’s conduct, but observed that they reflected her personal feelings of betrayal and not specific acts of provocation by Kumar. “It appears that the deceased was heartbroken by the alleged conduct of the accused on going back on his promise of marriage and so she proceeded to commit suicide. The diary noting makes it clear that it was her decision to end her life,” the court noted.

The court recognised the parents’ profound loss, however, stressed that, in criminal cases, the benefit of doubt goes to the accused if essential offence elements are unproven. The court stated, “The materials on record do not make out a case that the accused played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide.”

As a result, the court allowed the application for discharge, noting that “no purpose would be served by proceeding with the case because the materials on record even if unrebutted would not prove the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC”.