Right Word | How China Is Playing Both Sides In Conflict-Ridden Myanmar – News18

Last Updated:November 05, 2024, 18:08 IST

China’s sly game in Myanmar is obvious and it remains to be seen if it becomes successful in its attempts at ‘resolving’ the ongoing civil war

It has been more than three years since the military coup deposed the democratically elected National League for Democracy in Myanmar. The coup was soon followed by what is called the Burmese Spring Revolution — an ongoing civil war led by insurgent groups of the country’s various ethnic armed organisations (EAO) and militias, notable among them being the Three Brotherhood Alliance (Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army). Many of these insurgents have also aligned with the now exiled National Unity Government (NUG) in their efforts to counter the Myanmar military — Tatmadaw.

The ongoing civil war has perpetuated the country’s volatile political state, which has witnessed the biggest humanitarian crisis since Myanmar’s independence. China, Myanmar’s largest trading partner and a close ally, has major economic and strategic interests in the landlocked nation. Myanmar became a signatory of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2018, with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), designed to provide China access to the Indian Ocean, being recognised as a flagship project under the BRI. However, things became complex after the 2021 coup, and China has since undertaken active intervention to secure its interests in Myanmar.

If one were to look at China’s approach to the 2021 coup, it was among the few countries that not only refrained from condemning the junta but was also one of the first to recognise the military regime. It is believed by many that the coup was backed by China. Taking advantage of the post-coup uncertainty, Beijing quickly got involved in amplifying its influence in Myanmar. It promised unwavering support to the State Administration Council (SAC) — the Myanmar military government established after the 2021 coup — “no matter how the situation changes” and maintained high-level interactions. This is reflected in the significant military, financial, and political support provided by Beijing.

The reason behind this is the junta’s control over Myanmar’s crucial state infrastructure, which is crucial for Beijing in furthering its economic interests in the region. Therefore, cooperation with the military is aimed at sustaining Beijing’s increasing influence and long-term interests in the region. Without a doubt, the military regime has been predominantly reliant on Chinese support, considering the international sanctions it faces that consider the military regime to be “illegal”.

At the same time, China has been adopting a hedging strategy with anti-junta ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) through simultaneous engagement, mainly because many of these militia groups are concentrated along strategic borders, including with China. The control of EAOs along the Sino-Myanmar border, especially in the northern states of Shan and Kachin, explains China’s unofficial cooperation with the EAOs, for instance, allowing arms smuggling and providing training to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which was further dispersed to other armed groups like the Three Brotherhood Alliance. China’s hedging strategy is believed to ensure the smooth progress of its BRI projects along the border region.

The northern states of Shan and Kachin have been noted for being the hub of illicit activities, mainly, the drug trade and human trafficking perpetrated by Chinese nationals. These illicit activities, carried out by armed militias, have been reported to have surged following the 2021 coup. Moreover, these areas also emerged as scam centres, rooted in Chinese syndicated-backed human trafficking and forced labour and evolved into transnational crimes linked to the BRI, much to Beijing’s concern. The inability, or rather unwillingness, of the junta to check this issue, which quite obviously aggravated the instability along the Sino-Myanmar border, despite China’s request, seems to have changed China’s equation with the junta.

This is notable in the Chinese government’s tacit approval for Operation 1027 in October last year, led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The operation resulted in the junta losing its control over several territories and EAOs gaining substantial control over strategic spots along the Sino-Myanmar border like Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and its deep sea port and the Sino-Myanmar gas pipeline connecting Myanmar’s Rakhine with China’s Yunnan, both constituting strategic significance for Beijing. This tacit approval by Beijing seems to be in exchange for the repatriation of Chinese nationals involved in scam operations in Myanmar. This is a classic example of China’s balancing role in Myanmar, despite its formal support for the military regime.

China’s engagement in diplomatic manoeuvring included chairing five rounds of talks between the junta and the Three Brotherhood Alliance and brokering two (temporary) ceasefire agreements (January and September 2024) in efforts to secure trade routes that fall under its CMEC, whose work faced considerable disruption soon after the civil war broke out. However, these efforts failed to be successful, despite Beijing’s pressure tactics like blocking trade imports along the border.

As the junta is losing more and more control over bordering regions with China, notably six out of eight border gates, China is seen to continue backing the junta in the desperate hope that it would maintain stability in the region. It has come to light that Beijing has also been attempting to create rifts among anti-junta groups, manipulating them to sever ties with the now-exiled National Unity Government (NUG) that enjoys support from Western countries.

However, early this year the NUG, notwithstanding the prevalent anti-China sentiments within its camp, issued a 10-point statement, the first policy statement on China, pledging to safeguard China’s economic interests in Myanmar and endorse the One China policy. This reflects China’s role in potentially influencing the conflict dynamics in the region and the significant hold it enjoys in Myanmar, irrespective of the ruling regime.

China’s diplomatic efforts, acting as a peacemaker among rival parties in the civil war, are thus aimed at aligning Myanmar’s security concerns with its own strategic interests. However, the conflict is still unresolved, with no parties amicably reaching any agreement. This, despite Chinese efforts, tells us that Beijing is still in search of a reliable partner(s) who would guarantee the security of the region and of Chinese interests.

Beijing’s continued backing of the junta was reflected in a series of official visits and China’s pressing for elections (in Myanmar), however, only in areas under military control where it promised technical and other support. The election, proposed to be held next year, however, seems likely to have participation only from pro-junta parties. Many are predicting this to be a sham election aimed to solidify the junta’s power position in the country, a “Chinese election”, whereby Beijing would cement its footprint in strategically significant locations within the country, taking advantage of a plausibly weak military-backed government, to materialise its aim of having direct access to the Indian Ocean.

As reports are claiming the head of Myanmar’s junta will visit China next month, the first since the 2021 coup, it can be seen that Beijing is warming up to the junta again while the former is using this visit to regain its power. China’s direct involvement in the internal matters of Myanmar has already triggered protests within the country as well as among Myanmar’s diaspora population abroad. China’s sly game in Myanmar is obvious, and it remains to be seen if it will be successful in its attempts at “resolving” the ongoing civil war.

The writer is an author and columnist and has written several books. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.